We construct efficient, unconditional nonmalleable codes that are secure against tampering functions computed by small-depth circuits. For constant-depth circuits of polynomial size (i.e. AC 0 tampering functions), our codes have codeword length n = k 1+o(1) for a kbit message. This is an exponential improvement of the previous best construction due to Chattopadhyay and Li (STOC 2017), which had codeword length 2 O( √ k) . Our construction remains efficient for circuit depths as large as Θ(log(n)/ log log(n)) (indeed, our codeword length remains n ≤ k 1+ε ), and extending our result beyond this would require separating P from NC 1 .
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-malleable codes (NMC) were introduced in the seminal work of Dziembowski, Pietrzak, and Wichs as a natural generalization of error correcting codes [1] , [2] . Non-malleability against a class T is defined via the following "tampering" experiment:
Let t ∈ T denote an "adversarial channel," i.e. the channel modifies the transmitted bits via the application of t.
1) Encode message m using a (public) randomized encoding algorithm: c ← E(m), 2) Tamper the codeword:c = t(c), 3) Decode the tampered codeword (with public decoder):m = D(c).
Roughly, the encoding scheme, (E, D), is nonmalleable against a class T , if for any t ∈ T the result of the above experiment,m, is either identical to the original message, or completely unrelated. More precisely, the outcome of a t-tampering experiment should be simulatable without knowledge of the message m (using a special flag "same" to capture the case of unchanged message).
In contrast to error correcting codes, the original message m is only guaranteed to be recovered if no tampering occurs. On the other hand, non-malleability can be achieved against a much wider variety of adversarial channels than those that support error detection/correction. As an example, a channel implementing a constant function (overwriting the codeword with some fixed codeword) is impossible to error correct (or even detect) over, but is non-malleable with respect to any encoding scheme.
Any construction of non-malleable codes must make some restriction on the adversarial channel, or else the channel that decodes, modifies the message to a related one, and re-encodes, will break the non-malleability requirement. Using the probabilistic method, nonmalleable codes have been shown to exist against any class of functions that is not too large (|T | ≤ 2 2 αn for α < 1) [1] , [3] . (Here, and throughout the paper, we use k to denote the length of the message, and n to denote the length of the codeword.) A large body of work has been dedicated to the explicit construction of codes for a variety of tampering classes: for example, functions that tamper each half (or smaller portions) of the codeword arbitrarily but independently [3] - [9] , and tampering by flipping bits and permuting the result [10] .
In this paper, we extend a recent line of work that focuses on explicit constructions of non-malleable codes that are secure against adversaries whose computational strength correspond to well-studied complexity-theoretic classes. Since non-malleable codes for a tampering class T yields lower bounds against T (see Remark 2), a broad goal in this line of work is to construct efficient non-malleable codes whose security (in terms of computational strength of the adversary) matches the current state of the art in computational lower bounds. 1 Prior work on complexity-theoretic tampering classes: In [11] , Ball et al. constructed efficient nonmalleable codes against the class of -local functions, where each output bit is a function of input bits, and can be as large as Ω(n 1−ε ) for constant ε > 0. 2 This class can be thought of as NC (circuits of fanin 2) of almost logarithmic depth, < (1 − ε) log n, and in particular, contains NC 0 . In [12] , Chattopadhyay and Li, using new constructions of non-malleable extractors, gave explicit constructions of non-malleable codes against AC 0 and affine tampering functions. These are the first constructions of information-theoretic nonmalleable codes in the standard model where each tampered bit may depend on all the input bits. However, their construction for AC 0 circuits has exponentially small rate Ω(k/2 √ k ) (equivalently, codeword length 2 O( √ k) for a k-bit message), yielding an encoding procedure that is not efficient.
A. Efficient NMC for small-depth circuits
In this work, we address the main open problem from [12] : we give the first explicit construction of non-malleable codes for small-depth circuits achieving polynomial rate:
Theorem 1 (Non-malleable codes for small-depth circuits; informal version). For any δ ∈ (0, 1), there is a constant c ∈ (0, 1) such that there is an explicit and efficient non-malleable code that is unconditionally secure against polynomial-size unbounded fan-in circuits of depth c log(n)/ log log(n) with codeword length n = k 1+δ for a k-bit message and negligible error.
Extending Theorem 1 to circuits of depth ω(log(n)/ log log(n)) would require separating P from NC 1 ; see Remark 2. Therefore, in this respect the parameters that we achieve in Theorem 1 bring the security of our codes (in terms of computational strength of the adversary) into alignment with the current state of the art in circuit lower bounds. 3 For the special case of AC 0 circuits, our techniques lead to a non-malleable code with subpolynomial rate (indeed, we achieve this for all depths o(log(n)/ log log(n))):
Theorem 2 (Non-malleable codes for AC 0 circuits; informal version). There is an explicit and efficient nonmalleable code that is unconditionally secure against AC 0 circuits with codeword length n = k 1+o(1) for a k-bit message and negligible error.
Prior to our work, there were no known constructions of polynomial-rate non-malleable codes even for depth-2 circuits (i.e. polynomial-size DNF and CNF formulas).
We describe our proof and the new ideas underlying it in Section I-B. At a high level, we proceed by designing a new efficient non-malleable reduction from smalldepth tampering to split-state tampering. Our main theorem thus follows by combining this non-malleable reduction with the best known construction of split-state non-malleable codes [9] .
The flurry of work on non-malleable codes has yielded many surprising connections to other areas of theoretical computer science, including additive combinatorics [13] , two-source extractors [14] - [16] , and nonmalleable encryption/commitment [17] - [19] . As we discuss in Section I-B, our work establishes yet another connection-to techniques in unconditional derandomization. While we focus exclusively on small-depth adversaries in this work, we are optimistic that the techniques we develop will lead to further work on nonmalleable codes against other complexity-theoretic tampering classes (see the full version [20] for a discussion on the possible applicability of our techniques to other classes).
Remark 1 (On the efficiency of non-malleable codes).
A few prior works on non-malleable codes use a nonstandard definition of efficiency, only requiring encoding/decoding to take time that is polynomial in the length of the codeword (namely, the output of the encoding algorithm), thus allowing a codeword and computational complexity that is super-polynomial in the message length. In contrast, we use the standard definition of efficiency-running time that is polynomial in the length of the input. While the non-standard definition is appropriate in some settings, we argue that the standard definition is the right one in the context of non-malleable codes. Indeed, many error-correcting codes in the literature fall under the category of block codes-codes that act on a block of k bits of input data to produce n bits of output data, where n is known as the block size. To encode messages m with length greater than k, m is split into blocks of length k and the error-correcting code is applied to each block at a time, yielding a code of rate k/n. For block codes, the block size n can be fixed first and then k can be set as a function of n. A non-malleable code, however, cannot be a block code: If m is encoded block-by-block, the tampering function can simply "destroy" some blocks while leaving the other blocks untouched, thus breaking non-malleability. Instead, non-malleable codes take the entire message m as input and encode it in a single shot. So in the non-malleable codes setting, we must assume that k is fixed first and that n is set as a function of k. Thus, in order to obtain efficient codes, the parameters of the code must be polynomial in terms of k.
Remark 2 (On the limits of extending our result). Because any function in NC 1 can be computed by a polynomial-size unbounded fan-in circuit of depth O(log(n)/ log log(n)) (see e.g. [21] , [22] ), any nontrivial non-malleable code for larger depth circuits would yield a separation of NC 1 from P. Here, we take non-trivial to mean that error is bounded away from 1 and encoding/decoding run in time polynomial in the codeword length (namely, even an inefficient code, as per the discussion above, can be non-trivial). This follows from the fact (noted in many previous works) that any explicit, non-trivial code is vulnerable to the simple P-tampering attack: decode, flip a bit, re-encode. Hence, in this respect Theorem 1 is the limit of what we can hope to establish given the current state of the art in circuit and complexity theory.
B. Our Techniques
At a high level, we use the non-malleable reduction framework of Aggarwal et al. [13] . Loosely speaking, an encoding scheme (E, D) non-malleably reduces a "complex" tampering class, F, to a "simpler" tampering class, G, if the tampering experiment (encode, tamper, decode) behaves like the "simple" tampering (for any f ∈ F, D(f (E(·))) ≈ G f , a distribution over G). [13] showed that a non-malleable code for the simpler G, when concatenated with an (inner) non-malleable reduction (E, D) from F to G, yields a non-malleable code for the more "complex" F. (See Remark 3 for a comparison of our approach to that of [12] .)
Our main technical lemma is a new non-malleable reduction from small-depth tampering to split-state tampering, where left and right halves of a codeword may be tampered arbitrarily, but independently. We achieve this reduction in two main conceptual steps. We first design a non-malleable reduction from smalldepth tampering to a variant of local tampering that we call leaky local, where the choice of local tampering may depend on leakage from the codeword. This step involves a careful design of pseudorandom restrictions with extractable seeds 4 , which we use in conjunction with the pseudorandom switching lemma of Trevisan and Xue [23] to show that small-depth circuits "collapse" to local functions under such restrictions. In the second (and more straightforward) step, we reduce leaky-local tampering to split-state tampering using techniques from [11] . We now describe both steps in more detail.
Small-Depth Circuits to Leaky Local Functions.: To highlight some of the new ideas underlying our non-malleable reduction, we first consider the simpler case of reducing w-DNFs (each clause contains at most w literals) to the family of leaky local functions. The reduction for general small-depth circuits will follow from a recursive composition of this reduction.
A non-malleable reduction (E, D) reducing DNFtampering to (leaky) local-tampering needs to satisfy two conditions (i) Pr[D(E(x)) = x] = 1 for any x and, (ii) D•f •E is a distribution over (leaky) local functions for any width-w DNF f . A classic result from circuit complexity, the switching lemma [24] - [27] , states that DNFs collapse to local functions under fully random restrictions ("killing" input variables by independently fixing them to a random value with some probability). 5 Thus a natural choice of E for satisfying (ii) is to simply sample from the generating distribution of restrictions and embed the message in the surviving variable locations (fixing the rest according to restriction). However, although f • E becomes local, it is not at all clear how to decode and fails even (i). To satisfy (i), a naive idea is to simply append the "survivor" location information to the encoding. However, this is now far from a fully random restriction (which requires among other things that the surviving variables are chosen independently of the random values used to fix the killed variables) is no longer guaranteed to "switch" the DNFs to local functions with overwhelming probability.
To overcome these challenges, we employ pseudorandom switching lemmas, usually arising in the context of unconditional derandomization, to relax the stringent properties of the distribution of random restrictions 4 Recall that random restriction of a circuit randomly selects certain input wires of the circuit to fix to randomly chosen values. If the restriction is a pseudorandom pseudorandom, the random choices are performed pseudorandomly via a short seed (much smaller than the number of input wires to the circuit). Informally, we say the seed of pseudorandom restriction is extractable if there is an efficient procedure that recovers the seed from string formed by the values the restriction fixes to the chosen input wires and any setting of the wires unfixed by the restriction. 5 The switching lemma actually shows that DNFs become smalldepth decision trees under random restrictions. However, it is this (straightforward) consequence of the switching lemma that we will use in our reduction. needed for classical switching lemmas. In particular, we invoke a recent pseudorandom switching lemma of Trevisan and Xue [23] , which reduces DNFs to local functions (with parameters matching those of [27] ) while only requiring that randomness specifying survivors and fixed values be σ-wise independent 6 . This allows us to avoid problems with independence arising in the naive solution above: We append a σ-wise independent encoding of the (short) random seed that specifies the surviving variables. This gives us a generating distribution of random restrictions such that (a) DNFs are switched to local functions, and (b) the seed can be decoded and used to extract the input locations.
At this point, we can satisfy (i) easily: D decodes the seed (whose encoding is always in, say, the first m coordinates), then uses the seed to specify the surviving variable locations and extract the original message. In addition to correctness, f •E becomes a distribution over local functions where the distribution only depends on f (not the message). However, composing D with f • E induces dependence on underlying message: tampered encoding of the seed, may depend on the message in the survivor locations. The encoded seed is comparatively small and thus (assuming the restricted DNF collapses to a local function) requires a comparatively small number of bits to be leaked from the message in order to simulate the tampering of the encoded seed. Given a well simulated seed we can accurately specify the local functions that will tamper the input (the restricted DNFs whose output locations coincide with the survivors specified by the tampered seed). This is the intermediate leaky local tampering class we reduce to, which can be described via the following adversarial game: (1) the adversary commits to N local functions, (2) the adversary can select m of the functions to get leakage from, (3) the adversary then selects the actual tampering function to apply from the remaining local functions.
To deal with depth d circuits, we recursively apply this restriction-embedding scheme d times. Each recursive application allows us to trade a layer of gates for another (adaptive) round of m bits of leakage in the leaky local game. One can think of the recursively composed simulator as applying the composed random restrictions to collapse the circuit to local functions and then, working inwardly, sampling all the seeds and the corresponding survivor locations until the final survivor locations can be used to specify the local tampering.
Leaky Local Functions to Split State.: Ball et al. [11] gave non-malleable codes for local functions via a non-malleable reduction to split state. We make a simple modification to a construction with deterministic decoding from the appendix of the paper to show leaky local functions (the class specified by the above game) can be reduced to split state. Loosely, we can think of the reduction in the following manner:
First, the left and right states are given leakageresilient properties via σ L -wise and σ R -wise independent encodings. These encodings have the property that any small set (here, a constant fraction of the length of the encoding) of bits will be uniformly distributed, regardless of the message inside. This will allow us, in some sense, to leak bits from the underlying encoding to (a) specify the local tampering functions, and (b) aid in subsequent stages of the reduction.
Second, we take the right encoding to be much longer than the left encoding. Because the tampering will be local, this means that the values of the bits on the right used to tamper the left encoding will be uniformly distributed, regardless of the message. This follows from the fact that there aren't too many such bits relative to the length of the right, given that there significantly fewer output bits on the left and these outputs are each dependent on relatively few bits in general.
Third, we embed the left encoding pseudorandomly in a string that is much longer than the right encoding. This means that with overwhelming probability the bits of the left encoding that affect the tampering of the right will be uniformly distributed. (The rest we can take to be uniformly distributed as well.) Note that although here we use a σ-wise independent generator, an unconditional PRG for small space, as is used in [11] , would have worked as well.
Finally, we prepend to the embedding itself, the short seed used to generate the embedding, after encoding it in a leakage resilient manner (as above). (This is the only significant difference with the construction in [11] .) The presence of the seed allows us to determine the embedding locations in the absence of tampering and to simulate the locations in the presence of tampering, without violating the leakage-resilient properties of the left and right state encodings. The leakage-resilience of the seeds encoding allows a simulator to sample the seed after leaking bits to specify a local tampering. codes with at best exponentially small rate (see pg. 10 of [12] for a discussion of this issue). Circumventing this limitation therefore necessitates a significantly different approach, and indeed, as discussed above we construct our non-malleable codes without using extractors as an intermediary. (On a more technical level, we remark that [12] uses the classic switching lemma of Håstad [27] for fully random restrictions, whereas our work employs a recent extension of this switching lemma to pseudorandom restrictions [23] .)
C. Related Work
Non-malleable codes were introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak, and Wichs [1] , [2] . Various subsequent works re-formulated the definition [13] , or considered extensions of the notion [30] - [33] . The original work of [1] presented a construction of non-malleable codes against bit-wise tampering, and used the probabilistic method to prove the existence of non-malleable codes against tampering classes F of bounded size (this result gives rise to constructions for the same tampering classes F in the random oracle model). A sequence of works starting from the work of Liu and Lysyanskaya [34] presented constructions of non-malleable codes secure against split-state tampering. The original work and some subsequent works [35] , [36] required an untamperable common reference string (CRS) and/or computational assumptions. Other works removed these restrictions and achieved unconditionally non-malleable codes against split-state tampering with no CRS [6] , [8] , [9] , [13] . Among these works, the construction of Li [9] currently achieves the best rate of Ω(log log n/ log n) for two states. Constructions requiring more than two split-states, and which achieve constant rate, were also given in [5] , [37] .
Conditional results on complexity-based tampering.: In this paper we work within the standard model and focus on explicit, unconditional nonmalleable codes. A variety of non-malleable codes against complexity-based tampering classes have been constructed in other models. These constructions require either common randomness (CRS), access to a public random oracle, and/or computational/cryptographic assumptions.
Faust et al. [38] presented an efficient non-malleable code, in the CRS model, against tampering function families F of bounded size, improving upon the original work of [1] . Since the size of the CRS grows with the size of the function family, this approach cannot be used to obtain efficient constructions of non-malleable codes against tampering classes that contain circuits of unbounded polynomial size (e.g., AC 0 circuits). Cheraghchi and Guruswami [3] in an independent work showed the existence of unconditionally secure non-malleable codes (with no CRS) against tampering families F of bounded size via a randomized construction. However their construction is inefficient for negligible error (and also does not apply to AC 0 due to the requirement of bounded size).
Faust et al.
[39] gave constructions of (a weaker notion of) non-malleable codes against space-bounded tampering in the random oracle model.
In very recent work, Ball et al. [40] presented a general framework for converting average-case bounds for a class C into efficient non-malleable codes against the same class C in the CRS model and under cryptographic assumptions. Among several applications of their framework, they give a construction of non-malleable codes against AC 0 tampering circuits in the CRS model under these assumptions (in fact, circuits of depth up to Θ(log(n)/ log log(n)), like in our work). In contrast, our constructions are unconditional.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Basic Notation
For a positive integer n, let [n] to denote {1, . . . , n}. For x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ {0, 1} n , x 0 denotes the number of 1's in x. For i ≤ j ∈ [n], we define x i:j := (x i , . . . , x j ). For a set S ⊆ [n], x S denotes the projection of x to S. For S ∈ [n] m , x S := (x S1 , . . . , x Sm ). For x, y ∈ {0, 1} n , if they disagree on at least ε · n indices, we say they are ε-far, otherwise, they are ε-close to each other.
For a set Σ, we use Σ Σ to denote the set of all functions from Σ to Σ. Given a distribution D, z ← D denotes sample z according to D. For two distributions D 1 , D 2 over Σ, their statistical distance is defined as
We say g(n) =Õ(f (n)) if g(n) = O(n ε f (n)) for all ε > 0. Non-malleable codes were first defined in [1] . Here we use a simpler, but equivalent, definition based on the following notion of non-malleable reduction by Aggarwal et al. [13] . Moreover, the rate of such a code is taken to be k/n(k).
B. Non-malleable Reductions and Codes
The following useful theorem allows us to compose non-malleable reductions.
C. Tampering Function Families 1) Split-State and Local Functions:
Definition 4 (Split-State Model). [1] The split-state model, SS k , denotes the set of all functions:
Theorem 4 (Split-State NMC). [9] For any n ∈ N, there exists an explicit, efficient non-malleable code in the 2-split-state model (SS n ) with rate k/n = Ω(log log n/ log n) and error 2 −Ω(k) Definition 5 (Local Functions). Let f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m be a function. We say output j of f depends on input i if there exists x, x ∈ {0, 1} n that differ only in the ith coordinate such that f (x) j = f (x ) j . We say f is -local or in the class Local , if every output bit f j depends on at most input bits.
2) Small-Depth Circuits and Decision Trees:
Let AC d (S) denote alternating depth d circuits of size at most S with unbounded fan-in. Let w-AC d (S) denote alternating depth d circuits of size at most S with fanin at most w at the first level and unbounded fanin elsewhere. For depth 2 circuits, a DNF is an OR of ANDs (terms) and a CNF is an AND or ORs (clauses). The width of a DNF (respectively, CNF) is the maximum number of variables that occur in any of its terms (respectively, clauses). We use w-DNF to denote the set of DNFs with width at most w. Let DT(t) denote decision trees with depth at most t. We say that
3) Leaky Function Families: Given an arbitrary class of tampering functions, we consider a variant of the class of tampering functions which may depend in some limited way on limited leakage from the underlying code word.
Definition 6 (Leaky Function Families). Let LL i,m,N [C] denote tampering functions generated via the following game:
1) The adversary first commits to N functions from a class C,
The adversary then has i-adaptive rounds of leakage. In each round j ∈ [i],
• the adversary selects s indices from [N ], denoted S j , • the adversary receives F (x) Sj . Formally, we take h j : {0, 1} m(j−1) → [N ] m to be the selection function such that
Let h 1 be the constant function that outputs S 1 .
3) Finally, selects a sequence of n functions
Formally, we take h : {0, 1} mi → [N ] n such that h(F (X) S1 , . . . , F (X) Si ) = T . Thus, any τ ∈ LL i,m,N [C] can be described via (F , h 1 , · · · , h i , h). In particular, we take τ = Eval(F , h 1 , · · · , h i , h) to denote the function whose output given input X is T (X), where T is, in turn, outputted by the above game given input X and adversarial strategy (F , h 1 , · · · , h i , h). Definition 7 (Binary Reconstructable Probabilistic Encoding). [41] , [42] We say a triple (E, D, R) is a binary reconstructable probabilistic encoding scheme with parameters (k, n, c err , c sec ), where k, n ∈ N, 0 ≤ c err , c sec < 1, if it satisfies the following properties: 
Theorem 5 (Polylogarithmic independence fools CNF formulas [28] , [29] ). The class of M -clause CNF formulas is ε-fooled by O((log(M/ε)) 2 )-wise independence.
Theorem 6 (A Pseudorandom version of Håstad's switching lemma [23] ). Fix p, δ ∈ (0, 1) and w, S, t ∈ N. There exists a value r ∈ N, r = poly(t, w, log(S), log(1/δ), log(1/p)), 7 such that the following holds. Let D be any r-wise independent distribution over {0, 1} n×log(1/p) ×{0, 1} n If F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} is a size-S depth-2 circuit with bottom fan-in w, then
where the probability is taken with respect to a pseudorandom restriction ρ ← R(D).
Proof: By Lemma 7 of [23] , any distribution D over {0, 1} n×log(1/p) × {0, 1} n that ε-fools the class of all (S · 2 w(log(1/p)+1) )-clause CNFs satisfies
where the probability is taken with respect to a pseudorandom restriction ρ ← R(D ). By Theorem 5, the class of M := (S · 2 w(log(1/p)+1) )-clause CNF formulas is ε := δ · 2 −(t+1)(2w+log S) 7 The exponent of this polynomial is a fixed absolute constant independent of all other parameters. fooled by r-wise independence where r = O((log(M/ε)) 2 ) = poly(t, w, log(S), log(1/δ), log(1/p)), and the proof is complete.
Taking a union bound we get the following corollary. Fix p, δ ∈ (0, 1) and w, S, t ∈ N. There exists a value r ∈ N, r = poly(t, w, log(S), log(1/δ), log(1/p)), such that the following holds. Let D be any r-wise independent distribution over {0, 1} n×log(1/p) ×{0, 1} n . Let F 1 , . . . , F M be M many size-S depth-2 circuits with bottom fan-in w. Then
III. NMC FOR SMALL-DEPTH CIRCUITS
A. NM-Reducing Small-Depth Circuits to Leaky Local Functions
Lemma 2. For S, d, n, ∈ N, p, δ ∈ (0, 1), there exist σ = poly(log , log( S), log(1/δ), log(1/p)) and m = O(σ log n) such that, for any 2m ≤ k ≤ n(p/4) d ,
where ε = nS 2 2 log +1 (5p log ) log + δ +exp(− σ 2 log(1/p) ). We define a simple encoding and decoding scheme (See Figure 1 below) and show this scheme is a nonmalleable reduction from (leaky) class F to (leaky) class G with an additional round of leakage if functions in F reduce to G under a suitable notion pseudorandom restrictions (recall definitions 8 & 9) . Lemma 3. Let F and G be two classes of functions. Suppose for n ∈ N, p ∈ (0, 1) and any σ-wise independent distribution D over {0, 1} n log(1/p) × {0, 1} n , it holds that for any F :
Then for i, N, k ∈ N, (E k,n,p,σ , D k,n,p,σ ) defined in Figure 1 is an
To prove Lemma 2, we instantiate Lemma 3 using the pseudorandom switching lemma of Theorem 6 (in fact, Corollary 1) and iteratively reduce AC d (S) to leaky local functions. Each application of the reduction, after the first, will allow us to trade a level of depth in the circuit for an additional round of leakage until we are left with a depth-2 circuit. The final application of the reduction will allow us to convert this circuit to local functions at the expense of a final round of leakage. We proceed to the formal proof. (1) , ρ (2) ):
Set
If L(G(ζ))n−m+1:n 0 < k, output ⊥ and halt. 2) Output Extract c, L(G(ζ)) . Proof: The second step of E guarantees that ExtIndices(L(G(ζ))) 1 > m and L(G(ζ) 0 ≥ k. Therefore, E R (ζ) is located in the first m bits of c and the entire x is embedded inside the remaining n−m bits of c according to L (G(ζ) ). By the decoding property of RPE from lemma 1, L(G(ζ) )) = x holds. The desired conclusion follows. Let S τ be defined in Figure 2 . We call a chocie of randomness ζ, U, r "good for F = (F 1 , · · · , F N )" (where r is the randomness for E R ) if F • E (·; ζ, U, r) is in G. We will show for any good ζ, U, r for F , D • τ • E (·; ζ, U, r) ≡ τ (·), where τ = S τ (ζ, U, r).
For good ζ, U, r, note that (1) F ≡ F | ρ and (2) ρ was used in both E and S τ . It follows that for all x, F (x) = F | ρ (x) = F (E (x; ζ, R, r)). Because h j ≡ h j for j ∈ [i], it follows by induction that y j = y j (the output of each h j and h j respectively, j ∈ [i]). Therefore, h(y 1 , · · · , y i ) = h(y 1 , · · · , y i ). It follows thatc [m] = y i+1 and L(G(D R (y i+1 ))) = L(G(ζ)). Consequently, h (y 1 , · · · , y i+1 ) outputs that exact same indices that the decoding algorithm, D , will extract its output from. Thus, τ (x) = D • τ • E (x; ζ, R, r) for any x.
Because S and E sample their randomness identically, the distributions are identical, conditioned on the randomness being "good." Hence δ is at most the probability that ζ, U, r are not "good for F ", i.e.,
Proof: We first show D = G(ζ) E R (ζ) U is σ-wise independent when ζ and U are uniform. As U is uniform and independent of the rest, it suffices to simply consider Z = G(ζ) E R (ζ). Fix some S ⊆ [n log(1/p)+m] such that |S| ≤ σ. By the secrecy property of the RPE and m · c sec ≥ σ, conditioned on any fixed ζ, Z S∩{n log(1/p)+1,...,n log(1/p)+m} is distributed uniformly. Therefore, ζ is independent of Z S∩{n log(1/p)+1,...,n log(1/p)+m} , so G guarantees that Z S∩{1,...,n log(1/p)} is independently of S ∩ {n log(1/p) + 1, . . . , n log(1/p) + m} and also distributed uniformly. Therefore, Z S is distributed uniformly.
Note that ρ in E is distributed identically to R(D) (See Definition 9), except when ζ * is used. Hence
By our assumption and a union bound over the N boolean functions, F ρ / ∈ G happens with probability at most Nε when ρ ← R(D). Observe that L(G(ζ)) n−m+1:n is a σ log(1/p) -wise independent distribution over {0, 1} n−m and each coordinate is 1 with probability p. Let μ = (n − m)p denote the expected number of 1's in L(G(ζ)) n−m+1:n . By linearity of expectation μ = (n − m)p. For k ≤ μ/2 and σ log(1/p) ≤ μ/8, we can use Theorem 5 from [43] to conclude that L(G(ζ)) n−m+1:n 0 < k happens with probability at most exp(− σ 2 log(1/p) ). The desired conclusion follows.
We now prove Lemma 2. Let t := log( ) and let σ := poly(t, log(2 t S), log(1/δ), log(1/p)) as in Corollary 1 so that any depth-2 circuits with bottom fan-in t become depth t decision trees with probability at least 1 − (2 2t+1 (5pt) t + δ) under pseudorandom restrictions drawn from σ-wise independent distribution.
We use AC d (S) • DT(t) to denote alternating (unbounded fan-in) circuits of depth d, size S that take the output of depth t decision trees as input. (Note may contain up to S decision trees.) Similarly it is helpful to decompose an alternating circuit (from w-AC d ) into a base layer of CNFs or DNFs and the rest of the circuit, Proof: Let F ∈ AC d (S) be a boolean function. Note that Theorem 6 and Corollary 1 are only useful for bounded width DNF and CNF. So, we view F as having an additional layer of fan-in 1 AND/OR gates, namely, as a function in 1-AC d+1 (S). Because there are at most S DNFs (or CNFs) of size S at the bottom layers of F , by Corollary 1, the probability that F is not in AC d−1 (S) • DT(t) is at most S 2 t+2 (5p) t + δ under the pseudorandom switching lemma with parameters p, δ, σ. So by Corollary 1, (E , D ) reduces AC d (S) to LL 1,m,n [AC d−1 (S) • DT(t)] with error n(S 2 t+2 (5p) t + δ ) + exp(−Ω( σ log(1/p) )) ≤ ε. By the fact that DT(t) can be computed either by width-t DNFs or width-t CNFs of size at most 2 t , any circuit in AC d−1 (S) • DT(t) is equivalent to a circuit in AC d−2 (S) • t-AC 2 (2 t S), in other words, a depth d circuit with at most S width-t size-S2 t DNFs or CNFs at the bottom. Hence, AC d−1 (S) • DT(t) is a subclass of AC d−2 (S) • t-AC 2 (2 t S) and the claim follows. ] with error at most ε.
Proof: Finally, for a boolean function F ∈ t-AC 2 (2 t S), Corollary 1 shows F is not in DT(t) with probability at most S 2 2t+2 (5pt) t + δ . So by Lemma 3, (E , D ) reduces LL d−1,m,n [t-AC 2 (2 t S)] to LL d,m,n [DT(t)] with error at most ε. The desired conclusion follows from the fact that DT(t) is a subclass of Local 2 t . By applying Claim 4 once, then Claim 5 (d−2) times and Claim 6 once, AC d (S) reduces to LL d,m,n [Local 2 t ] with error at most dε. Note that m = O(σ log n) throughout, and during each application of above claims, given a codeword of length n ≥ k ≥ 2m, Lemma 3 holds for messages of length (n − m)p/2 ≥ n (p/4). Therefore, the composed reduction works for any 2m ≤ k ≤ n(p/4) d .
B. NM-Reducing Leaky Local to Split State
Simple modifications to construction from the appendix of [11] yield a (LL d,s,N [Local ], SS k , negl(k))non-malleable reduction.
Lemma 4. There exists a constant c ∈ (0, 1), such that for any m, q, satisfying mq 3 ≤ cn there is a (LL q,m,N [Local ] =⇒ SS k , exp(−Ω(k/ log n)))-nonmalleable reduction with rate Ω(1/ 2 ).
Note that we do not actually require any restrictions on N . The construction and the proof of Lemma 4 can be found in the full version [20] .
C. Putting It All Together
In this section, we show our main results. By composing the non-malleable reductions from Lemma 2 and Lemma 4, we obtain a non-malleable reduction which reduces small-depth circuits to split state.
Lemma 5. For S, d, n, ∈ N, p, δ ∈ (0, 1) , there exists σ = poly(log , log( S), log(1/δ), log(1/p)) such that for k that k ≥ O(σ log n) and k = Ω(n(p/4) d / 2 ), (AC d (S) =⇒ SS k , dε + exp(−σ/2)) where ε = nS 2 2 log +1 (5p log ) log + δ + exp(− σ 2 log(1/p) ). For constant-depth polynomial-size circuits (i.e. AC 0 ), we obtain the following corollary by setting = n 1/ log log log n , δ = n − log log n and p = (log · log n) −1 = log log log n log 2 n , Corollary 2. AC0 =⇒ SS k , n −(log log n) 1−o(1) for n = k 1+o (1) .
The same setting of parameters works for depth as large as Θ(log n/ log log n) with n = k 1+c where constant 0 < c < 1 can be arbitrary small. We remark that one can improve the error to n −Ω(log n) by using a smaller p (e.g. p = n −1/100d ) thus a worse rate (but still n = k 1+ε ).
Combining the non-malleable code for split state from Theorem 4 with rate Ω(log log n/ log n), we obtain our main theorem. Theorem 7. There exists an explicit, efficient, information theoretic non-malleable code for any polynomialsize, constant-depth circuits with error negl(n) and encoding length n = k 1+o (1) .
Moreover, for any constant c ∈ (0, 1), there exists another constant c ∈ (0, 1) and an explicit, efficient, information theoretic non-malleable code for any polynomial-size, (c log n/ log log n)-depth circuits with error negl(n) and encoding length n = k 1+c .
